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Abstract 
We propose the use of agent based modelling to create a shadow account, that is, a 
secondary account of a business which is used to audit or verify the primary ac-
count. Such a model could be used to test the claims of industries and businesses. 
For example, the model could determine whether a business is generating enough 
funds to pay minimum wage. Parameters in the model can be set by observation 
or a range of values can be tested to determine points at which enough revenue 
could be generated. We illustrate the potential of agent based modelling as a tool 
for shadow accounting with a case study of a car wash business. 
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1. Introduction 
Stakeholders demand comprehensive and reliable disclosure from businesses on 
their activities, their performance, and the impacts that they have on society and 
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the environment. Businesses respond to this pressure by engaging in communica-
tion with their stakeholders through annual reports, sustainability statements, so-
cial media posts and personal communications (Owen et al., 2001). Such commu-
nications are presented as fact but have been found to overemphasise good news 
and downplay bad news, or to omit negative messages altogether (Guillamon-
Saorin et al., 2012; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011; Reimsbach and Hahn, 2015). The 
discrepancy between these corporate narratives and actual corporate performance 
has been termed the “reporting-performance portrayal gap” (Adams, 2004, p.731). 
Despite external assurance issued by commercial auditors (Comyns et al., 2013) 
this gap has not been substantially reduced (Knebel and Seele, 2015; Junior et al., 
2014). 
Stakeholders face major difficulties in verifying and evaluating the information 
provided by businesses yet need high quality information to empower them to act 
as watchdogs against companies who might jeopardise their interests and the 
interests of society at large (Heikkurinen and Ketola, 2012; Dingwerth and 
Eichinger, 2010). This watchdog capacity hinges crucially on access to 
independent information for complementing, balancing and verifying corporate 
accounts (O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer, 2009). Sources of independent information 
have been conceptualized as shadow accounts, sometimes called counter accounts 
or anti-accounts (Gallhofer et al., 2006; Boiral, 2013; Rodrigue, 2014). Although 
they can play a decisive role in revealing conflicts and contradictions in corporate 
communications that may destabilise the status-quo and spur change (Adams and 
Whelan, 2009), shadow accounts have largely suffered from being unsystematic, 
partial, selective and unreliable (Gray et al., 2014). One may generally assume a 
negative correlation between the independence of parties issuing shadow accounts 
and their access to internal business information and this hampers the validity of 
their conclusions. 
Hence there is a need for decision tools that can help external stakeholders to 
verify accounts provided by business, thus emancipating stakeholders from cor-
porate tutelage by enhancing their capacity to evaluate corporate disclosures and 
corporate action (Spence, 2009). Some approaches have already been developed 
for the area of financial accounting. These facilitate the evaluation of corporate 
disclosure—verbal and written—in terms of credibility. Nonetheless, there is a 
dearth of tools that enable external stakeholders to evaluate corporate action be-
yond financial accounting. We fill this gap by presenting agent based modelling as 
a tool to enable external stakeholders through mere observation, to estimate the 
risk of an illustrative company violating UK minimum-wage regulations. In this 
way, stakeholders may compare and contrast their own evaluation of business 
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impacts on society with the information released by a company, if they are able 
to observe at least some of the company’s activities. 
The paper is structured as follows. After presenting the background to shadow 
accounting and the use of decision support systems for challenging corporate dis-
closure, we briefly discuss agent based models (ABMs) and then build a model of 
a manual car wash business to present the features of ABMs that may be useful 
for shadow accounting. We conclude the paper by discussing our findings and 
highlighting our contribution to the literature. 
2. Background 
Businesses are inclined towards narcissism in that they seek “admiration and 
recognition by highlighting their laudable achievements and camouflaging most 
of their negative impacts, which are likely to undermine the grandiose image that 
the reported information promotes” (Boiral, 2013, p.1043). Although these aims 
are entirely compatible with sustainable business practices (Brown and Fraser, 
2006) they are distinctly incompatible with objective standards of reporting qual-
ity namely balance, completeness, accuracy and reliability (Boiral, 2013). Gold et 
al. (2016) conclude from an analysis of corporate reports in the agrifood sector 
that businesses tend to concentrate reporting on performance dimensions that are 
difficult to verify by consumers, in particular, sustainability. Similarly, Comyns 
and Figge (2015) have found through content analysis of greenhouse gas 
reporting in the oil and gas sector that the ‘experience’ and ‘credence’ 
information provided in sustainability reports (Comyns et al., 2013) is of low 
quality even though the percentage of firms reporting increased sharply during 
the period of the study. This evidence suggests that businesses leverage the 
elusiveness of many sustain-ability issues and exploit information asymmetries to 
the detriment of the consumer and stakeholder side. 
Referring to the notion of the market for lemons from Akerlof (1970), com-
panies taking advantage of the existing information asymmetry undermine the 
credibility of corporate reports on sustainability for stakeholders. By reporting only 
positive information, reports lose their quality meaning that they are not valued yet 
costly. Eventually this causes a shutdown in the market for information on 
corporate sustainability (Comyns et al., 2013) resulting in sustainability infor-
mation becoming valueless (cf. Guiso et al., 2015). Summing up our arguments we 
may note at the most conceptual level that information asymmetries inhibit the 
efficient allocation of resources among economic actors thus impeding the overall 
maximisation of social welfare. 
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To mitigate this information asymmetry, it seems important to promote shadow 
accounting from its niche existence tied to a few beacons such as Traidcraft (Dey, 
2007b), Friends of the Earth (Dey, 2007a) and Corporate Watch (Gallhofer et al., 
2006) to widespread and dependable alternative sources of information about 
businesses. However shadow accounting tends to fight an up-hill battle. Especially 
in areas such as corporate sustainability reporting, companies are trying to 
appropriate it for its own purpose (Gallhofer et al., 2006). Thus, shadow accounting 
struggles to serve its democratic function of offering alternative perspectives and 
alternative voices for holding powerful institutions accountable for their actions 
(Gray et al., 2014). Moerman and van der Laan (2015) suggest that shadow 
accounting can challenge corporate accounting and communication by addressing 
1) the mismatch between policies and actual conduct, 2) the mismatch between 
disclosures by companies and those by external third parties, 3) deceitfulness and 
retention of information, and 4) secrecy regarding corporate decisions and their 
likely future impacts. 
Despite several attempts in the last fifty years and an array of potential ben-
efits, shadow accounting has largely remained “patchy, ad hoc, and unsystematic” 
(Gray et al., 2014, p.253) largely owing to lack of resources and insufficient 
backing from the scientific community. Early proponents such as the Counter 
Information Services (CIS) were distinctively radical. CIS were a group of Marx-
ist journalists that published alternative accounts on a number of corporations 
including Ford and Unilever that were mainly based on information from main-
stream media (Gray et al., 2014; Moerman and van der Laan, 2015). Although 
there have been a few academically driven shadow accounting projects such as the 
silent reports from the Centre for Social and Environmental Accounting Research 
on Tesco (Gibson et al., 2001; Adams, 2004), shadow accounting has not yet 
received sufficient academic support to fully develop its potential for society. 
Shadow accounting could strongly profit from innovative methods that help make 
sense of externally accessible information to challenge corporate speech. 
So far decision support systems in this area have mainly been deployed in the 
detection of fraud in financial accounting and transactions. Glancy and Yadav 
(2011) for example, have proposed a computational screening model for detecting 
fraud in financial reporting; Humpherys et al. (2011) use linguistic credibility 
analysis for a similar purpose; Fuller et al. (2009) use linguistic analysis for de-
tecting the risk of fraud in financial disclosure. More recently, Throckmorton et al. 
(2015) suggest that financial fraud detection tools may be enhanced by con-
currently considering vocal, linguistic and financial cues. Focussing on the vocal 
cues of manager narratives, Larcker and Zakolyukina (2012) analysed the lin- 
5 
guistic features of senior managements’ presentations during quarterly earnings 
conference calls to detect the likelihood of financial statements being manipulated, 
under the assumption that senior managers have knowledge of such manipulations. 
Burgoon et al. (2015) confirmed the usefulness of linguistic analysis tools for 
examining management utterances during earnings conference calls, and 
specifically underline the importance of unscripted responses. On a slightly dif-
ferent but related note, decision support systems based on data mining have been 
deployed for detecting credit card fraud, a crime which causes huge damage to 
business and society and which represents a significant concern for consumers 
(e.g., Ngai et al. (2011); Bhattacharyya et al. (2011); Bahnsen et al. (2016)); it has 
also been used to uncover instances of money laundering (Gao and Xu, 2009). 
While these examples show that there are a variety of decision support systems 
for scrutinising corporate financial accounts, no decision system for the analysis of 
social and environmental accounts can be found in the literature. This is not too 
surprising since financial accounting is in most countries embedded in a strong 
taxation and legal framework which specifies formal standards for auditing and 
assurance (Khalil et al., 2015). Failure to operate within this framework leads to 
litigation and this imposes real monetary costs on misstatements by management 
(Willekens and Simunic, 2007). In contrast, sustainability reporting remains largely 
a voluntary activity (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2007). 
Therefore new ways of shadow accounting to narrow the credibility gap should 
be explored. In particular, the social dimensions of sustainability—working con-
ditions, labour rights and community well-being—have been largely neglected in 
modelling approaches (Seuring, 2013). Agent based modelling has already proved 
its suitability to investigate the social side of business and technical systems (e.g., 
Wu et al. (2015)). Agent based modelling is especially suitable as a decision sup-
port system for examining the social claims of businesses, thus backing shadow 
accounting endeavours. 
Although there is a substantial and ongoing academic debate about how to 
deploy decision support systems for detecting fraud in financial accounting and 
transactions—in Decision Support Systems and other relevant journals—there is a 
striking dearth of literature on their use for scrutinising social and sustainability 
accounts, business reports, and business actions. On the other hand, the account-
ing and accountability literature features a lack of structured academic methods 
for verifying accounts that could mitigate the currently patchy and unsystematic 
nature of shadow accounting. This is despite a strong academic conversation on 
the shortcomings of corporately dominated accounts (Michelon et al., 2015) and 
the importance of shadow accounting and counter accounting. We contribute to 
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this by proposing ABMs as an innovative and versatile method for facilitating 
shadow accounting based on externally accessible information that helps stake-
holders to challenge business rhetoric and action, and hence create the ‘cognitive 
dissonance’ (Adams and Whelan, 2009) necessary for change towards business 
conduct that is better aligned with societal needs and preferences. 
3. Agent based modelling 
We propose that agent based modelling can be a useful tool for shadow ac-
counting. An agent based model is a representation of a phenomenon or system, 
built from the interactions and behaviour of autonomous units or agents. They are 
well known (Heath et al., 2009) but in brief: typically an ABM is a computer 
simulation, a set of duplicate packets of software code that process and respond to 
signals from other packets of code. The packets are the agents which are in-
stantiated to have certain attributes and then allowed to interact with each other in 
order to study the behavior that emerges. ABMs have successfully been used to 
study the swarming behaviour of birds and insects, the movements of molecules 
and other atomic particles under a range of conditions, climate change, the spread 
of fire, coastal erosion and a broad range of other phenomena. The use of agent 
based models in the social sciences is not common but is established (Borrill and 
Tesfatsion, 2011; Van Hemel et al., 2008; Bainbridge, 2006; Gilbert and 
Troitzsch, 2005) and has been used before in the study of decision support 
(Chesney, 2014; Lovric et al., 2013; Zaffar et al., 2011; Schramm et al., 2010; 
Macy and Willer, 2002). A robust philosophy of simulation exists (Winsberg, 
2010). Economics in particular has embraced agent based modelling and has 
described it as a ‘culture-dish approach to the study of economic worlds’ 
(LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008). In a well known exploration of the possibilities, 
Epstein and Axtell (1996) create an ABM of social structures in society built up 
from the interactions of individuals to show the emergence of group formation, 
trade and combat. Van Hemel et al. (2008) review the use of ABMs in military 
research. A common criticism of ABMs is that they overly simplify a complex 
situation (Louie and Carley, 2008), although we note that in fact, any social 
science methodology could be accused of doing the same. 
4. Car wash case 
4.1. Rationale 
In an almost throw-away line during a recent documentary (BBC Media Cen-
tre, 2016) an interviewee asks viewers to think about their spending habits and 
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consider that 5 people working on washing a car for 20 minutes with a total pay-
ment of £5 must involve them being paid less than the minimum wage (of around 
£7 per hour). An ABM can examine this claim, easily incorporating elements that 
other approaches such as spreadsheet models and systems dynamics would find 
challenging. Broadly there are two ways we can use an ABM for shadow 
accounting in this case and these involve either working forwards or backwards. 
Working forwards we can set model parameters after having observed the car 
wash for a time, to determine what revenue it generates. Working backwards we 
can run the model multiple times, each time varying parameter values to examine 
the points at which the wash generates enough revenue to pay minimum wage, 
and then ask whether these values are plausible. 
4.2. The model 
A real car wash was chosen as the basis for the model. There are two parts to 
the wash. When a car enters, it joins or forms a queue. After a wash the customer 
can pay £4 and leave or can opt for a valet service (wax and vacuum for £10). 
There are n workers at the car wash with typically n = [3,5] and this changes 
throughout the day with n = 2 when the business opens each day. We assume that 
there are always enough workers, either through the existing workers being 
unable to move because of a lack of opportunities, or from a large pool of 
potential workers who are ready to replace any that move. Each area is worked on 
by two people if they are available with others choosing (seemingly at random) an 
activity to contribute to. As it happens, there are two government vehicle count 
points on the stretch of road where the car wash sits showing an average of nearly 
20,000 cars passing each day (Department for Transport, 2014). The Government 
has also compiled statistics on the flow of traffic on the road throughout the day 
and these are shown in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
The car wash has fixed costs. We investigated these and estimate that they 
are between £200 to £500 per week for rent, water fees, electricity and council 
tax. For our model we take a median figure of £350, but we also look at what 
would happen using the minimum and maximum figures. The wash opens seven 
days a week. 
The simulation progresses in discrete time periods representing one second. 
During each, there is a probability that a car will drive past. In fact, there are two 
probabilities and they are time dependent: one for rush hour traffic prush and one 
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for other times pnorm. Figure 1 is roughly bi-modal and roughly uniform between 
the two peaks. We used it to estimate that 53% of the daily 20,000 cars passes 
the car wash during open hours, and 20% of that is rush hour traffic (note that 
the car wash opens at 9am and is therefore closed for all but the tail end of the 
morning rush hour). 
As each car passes the wash there is a probability pw that it will enter the 
wash. There is a probability pv that after a quick wash the customer will want a 
valet. Each car (the cars are the agents in the model) has two variables: w stores 
how many seconds it will take to wash and v stores how long it will take to 
valet, and these can vary to capture different sizes of vehicle on the road. Once a 
car is in a queue, any workers working on it will reduce w or v by 1 for each 
passing time period. If a driver approaches but sees a queue they may decide not 
to turn in. In this way, the ABM captures all the salient elements of the wash. A 
screen shot of the model is shown in Figure 2. 
From our observations, a wash takes an average of 525 person-seconds1, a 
valet a further 1,750 person-seconds. The queue never grew longer than five cars 
with drivers tending to turn away where there are three or more cars ahead of 
them. 
[Figure 2 about here.] 
4.3. Analysis 
In Section 4.1 we listed two ways of using an ABM as a shadow account for the 
car wash. Working forwards, we ran the model using the parameter values that we 
observed along with the publicly available data. This suggests that in a single day 
the wash would generate about £500 (£494), minus fixed costs giving £444. 
The second approach, working backwards, is to examine a range of values to 
determine the points at which a minimum level of revenue is generated, and then 
asking whether these values are realistic. Taking the probability pw, Figure 3 
shows the revenue generated when varying pw for three levels of n during one 
hour in non-rush hour traffic. The horizontal line shows the minimum needed to 
generate sufficient earnings for the wash to pay its workers minimum wage. At 
around p = 0.005 the car wash becomes profitable. Feeding this figure into the 
ABM causes just over 40 cars to go to the wash each day which seems realistic. 
1This means 1 person could complete a wash in 525 seconds; 3 could do it in 175, 10 could 
do it in 53. 
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[Figure 3 about here.] 
While pw = 0.005 seems realistic, we dropped this figure to see how high pv 
would have to be for the car wash to stay profitable. At pw = 0.001 the car wash 
was not profitable with any number of workers. At n = 5 and pw = 0.002 the wash 
was not profitable. With n = 5 and pw = 0.004 the car wash was profitable if pv = 
0.6 (the value we observed was 0.5 so again this seems at least plausible). 
In terms of the legality of the car wash then, the ABM gives the following 
results: £444 is enough to pay minimum wage and 40+ cars per day is a figure 
which certainly intuitively seems possible. Contrary to what the BBC documen-
tary suggested, our car wash does appear to be able to produce enough money to 
operate legally, even if we factor in the highest figure for fixed costs. 
(As an aside, we note that by examining the company accounts, we could work 
backwards to determine whether the firm’s claim that it is paying minimum wage 
is plausible. This could also potentially be used to detect fraudulent behaviour such 
as money laundering. The accounts of the car wash will be publicly available but 
we have not accessed them as in this instance our interest is not in fraud. It is 
important again to emphasise that our car wash example is illustrative and we do 
not suspect it of any illegal behaviour.) 
5. Discussion 
Our ABM suggests that this particular car wash is making enough money to pay 
its employees a minimum wage. We stress again that our illustration cannot and 
could not provide a proof of wage abuses in a strict sense: Just because a company 
earns enough to pay minimum wage does not mean that it does so. Similarly, just 
because it does not earn enough, does not mean staff aren’t being paid properly: 
Some business owners accept operating at a loss, for instance if the business is 
conceived as a hobby activity. We should also stress that in the case of the car 
wash, if insufficient revenue was being generated and workers were being paid less 
than minimum, it does not necessarily mean laws are being broken as is possible to 
employ workers as contractors working on a commission per vehicle. 
Instead, rather than providing any sort of proof, agent based modelling facil-
itates shadow accounting through its potential to indicate discrepancies between 
conduct published in company accounts and actual conduct based on indepen-
dently observed empirical data. In this way, the method we are proposing could 
be used to give an indication of various forms of fraud and unethical business 
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conduct. Taken further, ABMs may inform the development of a group of com-
putational screening models that go beyond the detection of fraud in financial 
reporting, towards the detection of fraud and deception in broader social aspects 
of business. 
The car wash ABM was not difficult to create and after observing the 
operation of the business, it only took an afternoon to implement. Someone with 
an interest in shadow accounting could learn to produce an ABM using modern 
tools, facing a learning curve that is perhaps only marginally steeper than that 
faced when learning to use a traditional accounting package. In fact the actual 
observation itself might be the most challenging part of shadow accounting and 
we note that our choice of case is one that is easily observed; this would not be so 
for many businesses where workers are for example in different countries, 
enclosed behind factory gates or as domestic workers behind closed doors. In the 
case of the car wash where it is easy to observe production activities and service 
delivery but difficult to draw robust conclusions from these observations, the use 
of ABM can be seen as an important instrument for shadow accounting. One may 
argue that consumers are increasingly in charge of flagging alleged cases of 
labour exploitation if production activities and service delivery are clearly visible 
to them. These suspected cases may then be taken up and scrutinized by actors 
that are skilled in using ABM modelling. 
Our results suggest that there is a place for ABMs that use empirical obser-
vations to provide a decision support tool for verifying corporate sustainability 
communications and scrutinising corporate action (Balineau and Dufeu, 2010), 
thereby helping to mitigate information asymmetries that are currently disadvan-
taging consumers and stakeholders (Gold et al., 2016). ABMs empower stake-
holders to actively fulfil their watchdog function (Heikkurinen and Ketola, 2012), 
and might even be useful for raising initial suspicion on the part of state authorities 
regarding criminal offences such as money laundering (cf. Gao and Xu, 2009) or 
slavery (cf. Gold et al., 2015). In this way, they represent a potentially powerful 
tool for shadow accounting (Rodrigue, 2014) that warrants further academic ex-
ploration and practical application. As illustrated in this paper, there is good reason 
to believe that ABMs may help to emancipate stakeholders from the tutelage and 
secrecy of business (Spence, 2009), and may strengthen the voice of societal 
stakeholders at the business-society interface thus providing an arena for a more 
cacophonic, equal, and democratic discourse about business conduct and the re-
sponsibilities of business towards society at large (Gray et al., 2014). In today’s 
world of ‘big data’, ABM may capitalize on decreasing costs of data production 
and dissemination thus reducing information asymmetries among societal actors 
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and ultimately improving social welfare. In the case of the car wash for example, 
data from satellites could be used for shadow accounting. Satellites tracking the 
fill rate of parking lots are already used by financial analysts to predict sales and 
hence create a shadow account of revenues of shopping malls (Balakrishnan, 
2016). 
Summing up, ABM represents a systematic and reliable procedure for creating 
robust shadow accounts if labour and other aspects of production and service can 
be observed by stakeholders but these data cannot be easily evaluated. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper advocates the use of ABMs as a tool for facilitating and enhancing 
the impact of shadow accounting. At the same time we acknowledge that our 
approach, and its presentation in this paper, does not go without limitations. First 
of all, production activities and service delivery need to be at least partly observ-
able to generate sufficient data to base the ABM on. This is often not the case when 
workers are in remote countries, in private domestic settings, or in fenced-off 
factories. Even if some observability is given, there is still the human factor of 
indifference that hinders endeavours of shadow accounting as by far not all stake-
holders are willing to get involved, raise concerns, and share their observations 
with people skilled in ABM. Furthermore, we have repeatedly emphasized that 
ABMs and shadow accounting more generally, have to be applied with caution so 
to make them tools for holding business accountable for their actions, rather than 
creating a destructive culture of suspicion within society. 
The paper extends the current academic debate about how to use decision sup-
port systems for detecting fraud and inconsistencies in financial accounting and 
transactions (e.g. Throckmorton et al., 2015; Burgoon et al., 2015; Bahnsen et al., 
2016) towards investigating and scrutinizing corporate sustainability accounting, 
communication, and actions. In this way, it sheds light on a so far largely neglected 
area of research. At the same time our approach shows one promising avenue of 
how the currently patchy and unsystematic nature of shadow accounting (Gray et 
al., 2014) could be replaced by more structured approaches. By proposing ABMs 
as an innovative and versatile method for facilitating shadow accounting based on 
externally accessible information, our paper contributes to the literature streams on 
decision support systems as well as on sustainability accounting and reporting. By 
increasing opportunities to scrutinize and challenge corporate rhetoric and action, 
the current ‘corporate domination of sustainabil-ity accounting’ (Michelon et al., 
2015) can be broken up. Consequently, ABMs 
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may be seen as important tools for generating ‘cognitive dissonance’ (Adams and 
Whelan, 2009) that makes business strategically and comprehensively incorporate 
societal needs and preferences. Hence, ABMs could strengthen the so far largely 
neglected social dimension when modelling sustainability in business. Their use 
would meet for example the resonating call in Decision Support System by Seur-
ing (2013) to increasingly base modelling approaches in sustainability manage-
ment on empirical data. They also represent an opportunity for interdisciplinary 
research when those with knowledge of agent modelling can partner with those 
with a desire to investigate practices in different industries. 
Agent-based modelling is certainly not the only method of modelling our ex-
ample of the car wash, but it comes with particular strengths that make it suitable 
for wider use in the field of social and financial accounting and accountability. Un-
like systems dynamics, ABMs are particularly suited to handling various forms of 
heterogeneity: different sizes of vehicle, peak days and months through the year and 
workers of different abilities taking breaks of different length throughout the day. 
ABMs allow for more dynamic interactions of agents and more complex recursive 
reasoning processes. Each parameter in a model can be varied and repeated many 
thousands of times, and scenarios can be compared. All of this can be done from the 
computer as soon as any observation of the business is complete. ABMs will show 
at what point enough money is being made by a firm for it to be able to pay the 
minimum wage and they can verify other aspects of social and financial accounting. 
We repeat our call that the use of ABMs as a tool for shadow accounting warrants 
further academic exploration and practical application. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of traffic flows by time of day and day of the week in the UK in 2014. The 
y-axis measure is normalised to give a unitless average of 100 and this allows an estimation of 
how the 20,000 cars passing the car wash will be distributed throughout the day. Source: Gov.UK 
(2014) 
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Figure 2: The initial model. Cars pass the car wash (the central area) and enter with a certain 
probability for a quick wash (the queue is shown on the left of the central area). Afterwards they 
may stay for a valet (shown here to the right of the central area). 
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(c) n = 3 
2 1  
Figure 3: The three panels show the revenue generated when varying the probability pw that a 
passing car will enter the car wash for three levels of n during one hour of non-rush hour traffic. 
The horizontal line shows the minimum needed to generate sufficient revenue to pay minimum 
wage. 
